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ABSTRACT
Small satellite projects often do not have the budget or schedule to incorporate radiation-hardened parts or extensive
radiation test campaigns into their schedule. Yet a case must be made that the spacecraft will function as intended in
orbit, with radiation, temperature and vacuum affecting part performance. The Vanderbilt Institute for Space and
Defense Electronics, with support from NASA HQ, NASA NEPP, and NASA JPL, has developed a platform for
making a safety case for systems with commercial (non-hardened) parts, called the Systems Engineering Assurance
and Modeling (SEAM) platform. The platform has three elements: goal structuring notation (GSN), systems
engineering models (SysML and our extensions), and Bayesian networks (BN). The GSN is a visual argument
structure that presents an argument that the system meets specifications based on goals, strategies, and evidence. The
systems engineering model is a high-level descriptive language that captures the spacecraft design and system
architecture through various diagrams. We extend the SysML diagram set to include fault propagation diagrams, which
map the environment, failure manifestations, anomalies, failure effects and responses (mitigation measures) of
components and systems. The SEAM platform provides a low-cost alternative to conventional radiation hardening
assurance paradigms.
1.0 INTRODUCTION

extensive documentation, lot-acceptance testing and
reliability analysis typically used on NASA Class A
missions. Consequently, CubeSats have a much higher
failure rate in space than conventional missions (Fig.1).
In this paper, we present an alternative to conventional
radiation-hardening and mission-assurance paradigms,
based on model-based system engineering and mission
assurance, that can be performed much more quickly and
with lower resource expenditure than conventional
radiation hardening paradigms. We begin with a short
review of radiation effects and describe the CubeSate
experiment that we apply the assurance method to. We
then describe the three fundamental aspects of the
System Engineering and Assurance Modeling (SEAM)
platform: modeling of the system architecture,

CubeSats and other small satellites present a great
opportunity for getting experiments into space quickly at
low cost. However, that short schedule and low budget
can lead to a high on-orbit failure rate because
conventional radiation hardening and reliability
procedures are typically not feasible during their
development. CubeSats typically use mostly
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) parts, not radiationhardened parts. Many first-time CubeSat designers and
developers are not aware of the impact that radiation and
temperature can play in the performance of electronics
in space. The low budget precludes extensive groundbased radiation testing and the use of rad-hard, spacequalified parts. The short schedule precludes the
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Figure 1. CubeSat Success/Failure Rate [1]
Figure 2. Impact of TID on supply current of DFlipflop, same part number, notice variation
with instance and manufacturer [2].

construction of a radiation safety case through a
graphical argument construct, and construction of
Bayesian nets to estimate relative probabilities of fault
impacts on system performance. We then discuss the
integrated assurance platform and its embodiment in a
web-based application on a public website.

radiation is almost always positive, so field inversion is
only a problem for n-channel MOSFETs. This effect is
illustrated in Fig. 2, which shows the supply current vs.
total ionizing dose for a D-Flipflop.

2.0 RADIATION EFFECTS

2.2 Single Event Effects and Latch-up

2.1 Total Ionizing Dose

“Single Event Effects” (SEE) is an umbrella term for
various effect that occur when an energetic ion deposits
energy in a semiconductor device or integrated circuit.
An ion from any element with atomic mass greater than
that of helium is considered a “heavy ion.” The sources
of ions are the sun and galactic cosmic rays. In addition,
the Van Allen belts around the earth consist of electrons
or protons trapped in the earth’s magnetic field. The
actual “radiation environment,” or concentrations and
fluxes of ions of various species, of charged particles is
a function of orbit or position in space, e.g., the lunar
radiation enrionment is quite different from low earth
orbit around earth. A detailed introduction to single
events is given in [6].

Radiation exposure produces relatively stable, long-term
changes in device and circuit characteristics that may
result in parametric degradation or functional failure.
The total ionizing dose primarily impacts insulating
layers. In state-of-the-art MOS integrated circuits (ICs),
effects of radiation-induced charge on gate oxides are
small, but field oxides and isolation structures are
usually less radiation-tolerant than the active device
regions. Total ionizing dose is specified in units of rads,
which are units of absorbed energy per unit mass for a
given material, for example, rad(SiO2)
The behavior of these thick field oxides and shallow
trench isolation regions dominates the radiation response
of most unhardened CMOS integrated circuits. As
positive charge is trapped in these oxides, negative
charge is induced in the nearby Si. For p-type substrates
or wells, an inversion layer will form when the positive
charge density in the oxide becomes sufficiently high.
The inversion layer can short the source and drain of a
transistor together at the edge of the active area. It also is
possible to invert the field region between adjacent nchannel devices, leading to leakage currents between the
drain of one transistor and the source of another. These
mechanisms are described in greater detail, with
examples, in [3-5, 15].

When an ion passes through a semiconductor in an
integrated circuit, it deposits energy in the
semiconductor lattice, which ionizes the atoms in the
lattice and liberates holes and electrons, creating mobile
charge in the device. This mobile charge can move to the
terminals of the transistor or diode and cause current and
voltage transients. The transients cause a wide range of
effects including single event upset of bits in memories
or latches (SEU), single event transient (SET) pulses,
and single event functional interrupts (SEFI) in FPGAs
and microcontrollers, which cause the digital device
control logic to hang up in an undesired state. These
events are usually non-destructive.

The transistor-level leakage current shows up as a large
increase in power supply current if significant portions
of the die are affected. The net charge created by ionizing
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do we need to change the way that we assess the
vulnerability of parts?
The CubeSat program at Vanderbilt was conceived to
generate data for research on the effects of radiation on
modern microelectronics. The RadFxSat platform is a
system architecture designed to monitor single event
effects and total ionizing dose in a component under test.
The system conducts the experiments and interrogates
the device, monitors and regulates power to the device,
and reports the status of the device. On November 18,
2017, the AO-91 satellite was launched into orbit
carrying the second such RadFxSat payload named
Phoenix. The Phoenix payload contained three instances
of the Radiation Effects Modeling (REM) experiment.

Figure 3: Top-level schematic of the SRAM
CubeSat radiation experiment REM board [7].

3.1 Radiation Effects Modeling (REM)

latchup (SEL)in bulk CMOS devices. Latchup is
common in COTS parts, since many of them are
manufactured with bulk (not SOI) CMOS processes. In
a latchup event, a regenerative condition occurs in the pn-p-n structure of the PMOS, the p-well, the n-well, and
the NMOS that causes the devices to be permanently on,
thus shunting current directly from the power supply
Vdd to ground. A sustained latch condition can result in
thermal damage to the integrated circuit and can only be
interrupted by turning off the power for a short time.
3.0 CUBESAT EXAMPLE:
UPSETS IN SRAM

SINGLE

The REM experiment was developed at Vanderbilt
University to report on the occurrence of single event
upsets in a commercial 28 nm SRAM. Although the
objective is to observe radiation effects in the device
under test, peripheral circuitry required to operate the
device should be should be immune to or capable of
recovering from single event effects. Each board
includes the device under test, a microcontroller and
non-volatile memory to conduct the experiment, and a
system of regulators and load switches to provide power
and mitigate against potential permanent failures due to
single event latchup. All components are required to
meet the total ionizing dose screening tests self-imposed
by the RadFxSat platform (> 30 krad(Si)).

EVENT

CubeSats make extensive use of commercial-off-theshelf (COTS) components that were never intended to
operate in space. As a consequence, these components
are subject to single event effects and total ionizing dose
failures. The electronic component that is often the focus
of research on single event upsets is a Static Random
Access Memory (SRAM). These memories are
ubiquitous and are extensively used by microcontrollers
and microprocessors to operate of program data. The
memory provides volatile storage of data, which can be
individually addressed and written or read. Each SRAM
cell stores a single bit of data in a bi-stable circuit. These
memory arrays tend to be designed with the smallest
available transistors, are highly integrated, and have
large storage capacity. These three factors make them
suitable for easily and quickly identifying single event
effects.

During flight, the microcontroller handles reading and
writing to the SRAM, counting the number of upsets, and
communicating science data and health of the board
through an I2C bus. The microcontroller writes a blanket
checker-board pattern to the memories and checks the
data after a 5-minute exposure. The total number of bits
in error for the exposure is added to the mission total
upsets and the experiment live-time is incremented. Both
values are updated in the telemetry and another exposure
begins. The two values together are sufficient to
determine the upsets per bit per day.
In Figure 3, a block diagram of the REM experiment
board is presented. The memory required multiple
voltage levels and complicated the design of the
experiment. The input power from the spacecraft is a
regulated 3V rail (blue boxes). This 3V is divided to the
different power domains by load switches to create a
3V_uC rail (green boxes) and 3V_switch rail (orange
box). There are three voltage regulators on the board to
provide the three voltage domains for the SRAM: 1.8V,
0.9V, and a variable core voltage (red boxes). The load
switches provide current limiting which protects against
SELs on the board. These load switches also prevent

In the last 10 years a number of investigators have
discovered that very advanced memories are susceptible
to upset from proton ionization [16]. The possibility that
on-orbit bit error rates might increase because of
ionization from protons is disruptive to our reliability
assurance techniques. The pressing question is how
much of the overall error rate will this account for and
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Figure 4. A functional decomposition model for “Count the number of upsets in the SRAM” [17].

high current conditions from propagating to the rest of
the satellite. The load switches result in 5 different power
domains on the experiment board which power all of the
integrated circuits (ICs) on the board.

functional and safety issues that need to be addressed upfront while dealing with space missions, rather than as
an add-ons to typicall terrestrial design flow.. This could
help avoid potential re-design from unexpected
problems and improve the chances of mission success..
Model-based engineering and assurance are in fact being
adopted even for large space organizations like NASA
[2,8]. In this section, we introduce some of the main
aspects and advantages of model-based design, in the
next we present a paradigm and platform that addresses
the specific issues of small-sat mission development.

The watchdog timer (WDT) assists the microcontroller
in recovering from SEFIs and SEU. The assumption
being that misoperation of the controller will result in an
unhandled exception, out of bounds memory access, or
program jump. Failure to make progress in these
scenarios will trigger a power reset by the hardware
watchdog timer. Configuration parameters are stored in
an external, non-volatile memory to both provide a
greater level of protection against (single-event) data
corruption and to continue experiment operation after
unforeseen power loss.
4.0
MODEL-BASED
ASSURANCE

ENGINEERING

A model can be defined as “A physical, mathematical, or
otherwise logical representation of a system, entity,
phenomenon, or process,” [9]. Models can be
constructed for any physical domain, such as electrical,
optical, or mechanical, and they can be classified as
computational or descriptive [10]. A computational
model is an equation-based model suitable for simulation
in computer application, which can be deterministic or
statistical. A common example would be the equations
for circuit elements in a Spice simulator. A descriptive
model is a human-interpretable model that captures
elements of system according to particular format, such
as a block-diagram or flow chart. The System Modeling
Language, or SysML, is a widely-accepted standard for
a descriptive model for systems. It is a graphical
modeling language that supports specification, analysis,
design, verification, and validation of systems, based on

AND

Fundamentally, model-based engineering is a top-down
design flow as opposed to the bottom-up design flow that
takes place on many first-time CubeSat designs. The idea
is to define the system performance goals and
requirements first then identify the high level functions
and their decomposition into more concrete
implementable functions, and finally build an
architectural model for the system and sub-systems that
provide the functions. - Setting up the problem (through
the models) in a systematic way, helps identify the
Witulski
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Figure 5. SysML Block diagram of REM board SRAM Experiment.
Red lines are power flows, green lines are signal flows.

the four “pillars” of SysML: structure, behavior,
requirements, and parametrics [11]. SysML defines
different kinds of diagrams that represent the system
including: behavior (functional), structural (blockdiagram), requirements diagrams, and lower-level
diagrams such as state machine or use-case diagrams.
Creating a SysML description of the system is the first
step in the proposed approach. A functional block
diagram showin the relationships between individual
functiona and the components that execute them is
shown in Fig. 4. A block-diagram representation of the
SRAM experiment board is shown in Fig. 5, showing
signal and power flows.

overall claim. Acceptance of the assurance case requires
that the argument by reviewed. GSN provides a way of
documenting the assurance case that allows others to
discuss, challenge, and review the assurance case.
The GSN model provides structure to show how the
overall claim is supported by sub-claims. These claim in
GSN are represented as goals and blue boxes in Fig. 6.
The assertion of evidence to support the truth of a goal is
represented by a solution and the orange boxes in Fig. 6.
When documenting the reasoning between the goals and
sub-goals, strategy elements, the green boxes in Fig. 6,
are used. These boxes are connected and show the flow
of the argument from top to bottom by solid arrows,
“Supported By” in Fig. 6, that show evidential or
inferential relationships. These three types of boxes
make up the main argument structure.

5.0 GOAL STRUCTURING NOTATION
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is a graphical notation
standard used to explicitly document an assurance case
and defined in the standard in [13]. An assurance case is
a reasoned and compelling argument, supported by
evidence, that a system will operate as intended for a
given, defined environment. This argument is made
through a series of connected claims that support an
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Figure 6. Explanation of Goal Structuring notation [2]

the grey boxes in Fig. 6, assumption boxes. Assumptions
are premises that need to be true in order for the goal or
strategy to be valid. The last type are justification boxes,
teal boxes in Fig. 6. These boxes explain why a goal or
strategy is acceptable. These three types of context boxes
are connected the main argument structure by dotted “In
Context Of” arrows. All of these boxes and arrows are
show in Fig. 6 and a more detailed explanation of the
example argument can be found in [7].

7.0 SEAM: SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSIS
AND MODELING (SEAM)
SEAM is modeling language, supported by a web-based,
collaborative modeling platform called WebGME, for
supporting a mission assurance process. SEAM borrows
a number modeling concepts and techniques from the
standard SysML but it extends those with new features
and adds completely new ones. It is compatible with
some SysML features, including: requirement models
and internal block diagram models, and those can be
imported into the modeling tool.

6.0 BAYESIAN NETS
A Bayesian Net (BN) is a way of computing joint
probalities by calculating conditional probabilities, for
example, the joint probability of X and Y and Z, often
written P(X,Y,Z), can be written as
P(X,Y,Z)= P(X|Y,Z) P(Y|Z)P(Z)

Having studied and used SysML on real systems, we
found that it is not sufficient for supporting an assurance
process – it needs several extensions. First, it lacks
support for functional decomposition, which is a core

(1)

[14]. An example is shown in Fig. 7, which shows a BN
for computing the probability that the data read from an
SRAM is good given assumptions about the radiation
environment. Each box in the graph consists of a
conditional probability table, a matrix of probabilities
that describe the outcomes given the value of the
condictional variable represented by the incoming
arrows to the box. It is possible to generate Bayesian nets
semi-automatically from the fault propagation diagrams
described in Section 7.1. The utility of a Bayesian net is
that it is a way to quantitatively evaluate the probability
of faults in a given system.
Fig.7 Example of a Bayesian Net showing the
probability of good SRAM data.
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Fig. 8. Fault propagation diagram for linear regulator operation [12]

systems engineering activity. Missions need various
functions from the spacecraft, hence the identification of
functions and their mapping to various (hardware and
software) components of the system is highly relevant.
Second, it has no concepts for modeling component
faults and degradations (to the environment effects like
radiation), their effects and the propagation of those, and
the impact of those on the various functions of the
system. Third, it does not directly support the modeling
of assurance cases: a formal or informal logical argument
that captures why the system is ‘mission safe’, i.e. it does
no harm that would put the mission at risk, in case of
components failing.

Fig. 8 shows the internal block diagram model (fault
propagation) of a ‘Linear Regulator’ block (component).
The radiation-effects such as ‘TID’ and ‘SEL’ are
captured as fault (‘F’ nodes) which lead to anomalies
(‘A’
nodes)
such
as
‘HighCurrent’
and
‘LowOutputVoltage’ which further lead to functional
degradation effects (‘E’ node) representing ‘Degraded
Operations’ in the regulator. Additionally, the SEAM
fault propagation model allows users to capture
responses (‘R’ nodes) of a component to failures. This
helps describe the mitigation functionality in the context
of fault propagation.
Further, the propagation of failures into and out of the
component are captured through labeled edges
(‘HighCurrent’, ‘WrongV’, ‘LowV’ etc.) connected to
the input/ output ports. The interconnections between the
component ports (in the system design) helps complete
the fault propagation model for the overall system.

While recognizing that SysML’s extension mechanism
based on stereotypes can be used to address these
concerns, we made our solution through adding the new
concepts as first class modeling elements to SEAM.
Below, we briefly describe (1) the method used for fault
modeling, and (2) how the various modeling aspects are
integrated in the language.

7.2 The SEAM Platform: Combination of SysML and
GSN and BN

7.1 The Fault Propagation Model

For mission assurance one is to build a set of assurance
cases that formalize why the system is ‘safe’ – i.e. why
it does ‘not do harm’ to the mission, even if components
exhibit various failure modes. We argue that such
argument can be built properly only in the context of the
entire system, including its requirements, functions,
design, anticipated faults, and its environment. Note that
this task necessitates not just the collection of these

In order to understand the vulnerabilities of the system
to be deployed in a CubeSat, it is important to understand
the faults that could originate in each component and the
local effect of these faults within the component and
global effect across the system i.e. in other components.
This information can be captured as a ‘Fault Propagation
Model’ in the SEAM platform, which improves upon the
SysML internal block diagram model.
Witulski
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integrated models for completeness, but, in themselves
are not sufficient for quantitative analysis.
Quantitative analysis of assurance cases considers the
uncertainty (or ‘degree of belief’) in the argument and its
evidence, hence it involves probabilistic reasoning. To
follow this paradigm, we associate SEAM models with
Bayesian Belief Networks (BNs). Currently this is done
manually, but we are working on a (partially) automated
solution.
The reasoning for BN-s is as follows: The assurance
expresses a logical inference chain structured as tree or,
more generally, a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), with
evidence at the leaves and the ‘top goal’ – the mission
assurance statement at the top. The intermediate nodes
combine evidence emanating from the evidence nodes
and propagating upwards, towards the top goal. Given
the calculation rules of the BNs and conditional
probabilities at the intermediate nodes, one can
propagate the uncertainty in the tree, resulting in a
probabilistic assessment of the mission safety, in terms
of the evidence available. Such inference is
straightforward to perform and several tools are
available. The key challenge he is how to obtain the
intermediate nodes’ conditional probabilities. However,
it appears the these can be obtained from tests and/or
operational data.

Figure 9. Relationship of the 3 paradigms in the
SEAM platform. [2]
models, but also the linkage among them. This is goal of
SEAM: to provide a language for integrated modeling.
In SEAM there various ‘links’ among the various types
of models available in the language. Below we list a few
of such links:
•

Requirements are linked to system functions. The
meaning of the link is that the function implements
the requirement.

•

Functions are linked to components. The link here
means that the component/s is/are required to
provide the functions. In other words, if the
component fails, the corresponding function may be
lost.

•

•

7.3 SEAM Website
SEAM platform is supported by a web-based,
collaborative modeling framework called WebGME The
SEAM platform can be accessed online at
https://modelbasedassurance.org where users can
browse through demo models as well as register for
accounts to create their models.

Fault Propagation models are linked to appropriate
functions through the functional degradation Effect
(‘E’ nodes) and mitigation Response (‘R’ nodes).
Here the links help understand how a function could
be affected due to faults (anywhere in the system).

SEAM platform allows users to create requirement
models (SysML style), functional decomposition model,
component library and system architecture model
(SysML Block diagram), fault propagation model
(extension to SysML Internal block diagram model) and
assurance case model (Goal Structuring Notation).
SEAM allows these models to be inter-linked so that the
different modeling aspects can be contextually related to
one another.

The ‘solution’ (or ‘evidence’) nodes in the GSN
assurance case model are linked to specific
components. The link means that the evidence is
related to the specific component.

Note that links are bi-directional and traceable. This
allows various automated checks on the models for
completeness, etc.

Fig 11. shows a screenshot of the SEAM modeling
platform. The users can edit the model by dragging and
dropping model elements from the “Model Parts Panel”
to the “Model Editor Canvas”. Models can be traversed
via the “Tree Browser” or by double-clicking on a model
element to move down the hierarchy. Model attributes
can be edited through the “Attribute Panel”. More
tutorial slides, papers and demo models can be found on
the website.

The integration of the SysML block diagrams (with
failure propagation graphs) and GSN provides a
powerful modeling paradigm, where a target system (e.g.
a spacecraft) can be modeled together with the assurance
that demonstrates its mission safety. The interlinked
models allow structural and informal checks on the

Witulski
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Fig. 10. Representation of the three platforms in SEAM [12]
8.0 SUMMARY
In this paper we describe a model-based assurance
platform called SEAM intended to provide a systematic
assurance case that a give satellite design will function
as intended in the specified space environment. The
approach is intended to provide systematic approach to
assurance without requiring extensive ground-based
radiation testing or the use of radiation hardened parts.
The first element in the platform is a descriptive
architectural model captured in SysML-like diagrams
that articulate the functional decomposition of the
design, the design structure, and the fault propagation
flow between components. The second element in the
SEAM platform is the use of Goal Structuring Notation
which uses a graphical argument construct to build an
assurance and safety case that the design operated
properly given the characteristics of the particular space
environment of the satellite. The third element in the
assurance flow is the use of Bayesian nets to estimate the
probability of observing degraded behavior or faults at
particular points in the mission lifetime. The platform
has been encoded in a browser-based application that is
available to the public for free (though registration is
required) at modelbasedassurance.com.
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